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AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT
AS A PRACTICAL AND REALISTIC STEP TO-
WARD WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW*
RIGNAL W. BALDWINt
The International Court of Justice represents the most
concrete effort to bring the Rule of Law among nations to real-
ity. The status of the United States in relation to that Court is
a matter of concern to the United States Senate, members
of our Bar, and to all our citizens at this time. It is the pur-
pose of this article to discuss that Court, the nature of the
.adherences to it by the United States and other leading na-
tions,'and the changes advocated in connection with our ad-
herence from the point of view of a Report of its Committee
,on World Peace Through Law recently adopted by overwhelm-
ing vote of the Maryland State Bar Association.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
'The International Court of Justice, or World Court, was
restablished in 1946 under the Charter of the United Nations.
It is essentially a continuation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice established in 1922 under the League
tof Nations. The Court has fifteen judges, elected by the Se-
=rity Council and the Assembly for nine year terms. The
present judges are from: Italy, Japan, France, United King-
dom, United States, Poland, United Arab Republic, Peru,
Soviet Russia, Argentina, Mexico, China, Greece, Australia
and Panama. Judge Winiarski, of Poland, was elected Presi-
dent of the Court in April, 1961, and in February of this
:year Professor Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University, be-
tecame the American Judge on the Court. In any case involv-
"ing a nation not having a judge, it is entitled to nominate
-,an additional judge of its own choosing on an ad hoc basis.
Adherence to the Court's jurisdiction is optional and may
be qualified or unqualified.
At present no member of the Soviet bloc of nine nations
has adhered on any basis whatever, though Poland and the
U.S.S.R. have judges. Cuba has never adhered. Thirty-nine
*Adapted from an address delivered at Law Day Exercises at the Uni-
versity of South Carolina Law School on May 1, 1961.
tAttorney; Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Maryland; Member
of The Special Committee On World Peace Through Law of the Maryland
State Bar Association.
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nations of the ninety-nine in the United Nations have sub-
mitted to the Court's jurisdiction in one form or another,
but only thirteen without material reservations or qualifica-
tions. Of the fifteen judges, ten are from nations that have
not accepted jurisdiction of the Court at all and four others
from nations that may withdraw at will.
The "Statute of the Court" provides that the Court shall
determine its own jurisdiction. In general, this concerns dis-
putes among nations as to treaties, questions of internationaL
law, and breaches of and reparations for international obli-
gations. The Statute requires the Court to apply "interna-
tional law," and lists a number of standards. The United
Nations Charter prohibits intervention "in matters ... essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,"' and the
Court has held this limitation binding on it.2
II. THE RECORD OF THE COURT.
Through 1960 the Court has dealt with twenty-five con-
tested cases and has rendered ten advisory opinions. When
the United States sued the U.S.S.R. for the shooting down
of an unarmed plane over the Sea of Japan, and in a suit by
Great Britain against Bulgaria, these communist nations sim-
ply refused jurisdiction to the Court. Only one case involv-
ing a communist nation has ever been decided. Britain sued
Albania for loss of a destroyer in international waters which
the latter had mined. Although Britain was awarded damages
for loss of its vessel and men, the award has never been paid.
This points up the fact that the Court is totally without power
to enforce its own judgments. In event of non-compliance,
the aggrieved party has recourse to the Security Council for
enforcement, but any vote thereon would be subject to veto
by the five permanent members. This is an ultimate escape
hatch relied on by those favoring outright and unqualified
repeal of the Connally Amendment.
III. THE UNITED STATES' ADHERENCE To THE COURT.
In August 1946, the United States Senate passed a resolu-
tion under which we became a party to the Statute of the
Court and accepted its compulsory jurisdiction subject to
certain reservations.3 This brings us to the Connally Amend-
ment.
1. U. N. CHARTER, art. II, § 7.
2. Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Roumania, I. C. J. Rep. (1950).
3. S. REs. No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's recommenda-
tion of adherence contained a specific reservation of "disputes
with regard to matters which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the United States." 4 On the Senate floor,
Senator Tom Connally, of Texas, Chairman of the Committee,
proposed an amendment to this reservation by adding the
words "as determined by the United States of America."5
These eight words constitute the Connally Amendment. In
support of this proposal, Senator Connally argued:
But under the Charter the Court might decide that
immigration was an international question. It might de-
cide that tariffs were an international question. It might
decide that the navigation of the Panama Canal was an
international question. It is pretty close to it.6
It is interesting that Senator Morse7 voiced similar views at
that time, as did Senator Vandenberg 7a and LaFollette.
7b
The opposing view then was and is now that such an amend-
ment impairs the prestige of the Court; that no litigant, not
even a sovereign state, should have the right to determine
the jurisdiction of the Court before which it appears.8
Since some attempt is made today to attribute the Amend-
ment to lack of proper consideration by the Senate, or to some
personal quirk of Senator Connally, the Senate votes are ex-
tremely important as well as impressive. The Amendment
was debated on July 31 and August 1, and was adopted on
August 2, 1946, by the vote of 51 to 12. Fifteen of the nine-
teen voting members of the Foreign Relations Committee
4. 92 CONG. REc. 10621 (1946).
5. S. RES., supra note 3, clause (b).
6. 92 CoNG. Ruc. 10624 (1946).
7. Id. at 10685.
7a. Id. at 10688.
7b. Id. at 10689.
8. To this Senator Connally replied:
Under the present Charter, the United States has the option
of accepting compulsory jurisdiction or the option of not accept-
ing it and simply relying on special provisions regarding each
case which might be accepted by the Court. So, within these ex-
tremes we have a perfect right to stipulate the extent of our
agreement as to compulsory jurisdiction.
.... There is nothing in the Charter which requires us to sub-
mit a domestic question, and the effect of my amendment is to say
that as to domestic questions we will not submit them, but we
will submit other matters.
Mr. President, there is nothing violative of the concepts of
the Charter or of international law in that course. We can abstain
and can stand where we stand now, if we so desire. We are going
a long way when we accept all character of jurisdiction except
jurisdiction as to domestic questions.
[Vol. 13
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voted in favor of the Amendment. The final vote on adher-
ence was 60-2, with all voting members of the Committee
favoring the declaration as amended except Senator Shipstead,
who was joined only by Senator Langer.
As succinctly put by a high official of the State Depart-
ment, which opposed the Amendment in 1946 and still offi-
cially stands for its repeal: The Connally Amendment "was
prompted... by a desire to safeguard the vital interests of the
United States."9
IV. PRESENT STATUS OF THE MATTER.
Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced a resolution 0 in the
86th Congress in 1959 calling for repeal of the Connally
Amendment. Behind this move was a strong group of highly
articulate American Bar Association members. Their spring-
board was a vote of the House of Delegates of the ABA in
1947 favoring a resolution that the Connally Amendment
be deleted from the American declaration. The vote then was
85 to 45, out of a membership of 248.
In offering his resolution, Senator Humphrey quoted from
and put in the Congressional Record a speech of the Chairman
of the ABA Special Committee on World Peace Through Law,
to whose statements reference will be made. However, great
opposition to repeal developed at the hearings and the Hum-
phrey resolution did not get out of Committee.
A similar resolution, introduced by Senators Humphrey,
Morse and Javits, is pending at the present session of the
Senate.
V. RESERVATIONS OF OTHER MAJOR NATIONS.
To properly understand any proposed alternate to the Con-
nally Amendment it is imperative first to consider the reser-
vations of other major nations.
The position of the American Bar Association Special Com-
mittee on World Peace Through Law, apparently sold to high
officials of our Government, and to a large segment of the
American public, was partly based on statements of its Chair-
man and other members regarding the reservations of other
nations. One such statement, made in an article by the Com-
mittee Chairman, published in the American Bar Association
Journal in July 1960, was:
9. Wilcox, The United States Accepts Compulsory Jurisdiction, 40 Am . J.
INT'L L. 699, 713 (1946).
10. S. REs. No. 94, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
4
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Such action [repeal of the Connally Amendment]
would only place our relations with the Court on the same
basis as those of France, the United Kingdom, Canada
and thirty other nations." (Italics supplied.)
Originally eight other nations adopted reservations with
clauses similar to the Connally Amendment. Much is made
by those favoring repeal, that of these countries, England,
France and India eliminated their so-called "self-judging"
reservations. But let us see what sort of reservations they
simultaneously adopted. These are facts not referred to by
so much as one line in the thirty-three page Report of the
Special Committee nor in numerous articles by its present
members.
Great Britain's new declaration of 1958 has nine specific
reservations or exclusions from the Court's jurisdiction.
Among these are: " . . . disputes arising out of, or having
reference to, any hostilities, war, state of war, or belligerent
or military occupation .... 1"12 Britain's declaration also con-
tains the privilege of withdrawal immediately upon notice1
(whereas the United States' declaration requires six months'
notice) .14 And it reserves the right "at any time ... to add
to, amend or withdraw any of" its reservations, to take effect
"from the moment of notification."'5
The present French declaration (1959) contains four reser-
vations. One excepts from the Court's jurisdiction "disputes
arising out of a crisis affecting the national security or out
of any measure or action relating thereto."'16 After July 1,
1962, France also will be able to withdraw its adherence at
will.'y
Both Britain' s and France19 exclude disputes with states
that had not accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
at the time the dispute arose, or for at least twelve months
before filing suit, or which joined the Court only for the
purpose of the particular dispute. Such a provision would
11. Rhyne, An Effective World Court 1 Essential, 46 A.B.A.J. 749,
752.
12. International Court of Justice Yearbook, 1959-1960 [hereinafter cited
as '59'60 Yearbook], pp. 254, 255.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 233-255.
15. Id. at 254-255.
16. Id. at 240.
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 254.
19. Id. at 240.
[Vol. 13
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bar Castro from accepting compulsory jurisdiction solely to
enforce Cuba's "titular sovereignty" to our naval base at
Guantanamo, as he has several times threatened to do.
Also India2" and Canada 2 1 now have at least some of the
exclusions and reservations provided by Great Britain's dec-
laration.
Finally, as to the thirty-nine adherents to the World Court,
twenty-three have the right to withdraw at will, in contrast
to our six months' notice requirement.
22
VI. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS AND ACTION.
Two Committees of the American Bar Association reported
on the Connally Amendment at its annual meeting in Wash-
ington in August 1960. That on World Peace Through Law,
the Chairman of which was Mr. Charles S. Rhyne, recom-
mended repeal by a 7-4 vote, while that on World Peace and
Law Through The United Nations recommended against re-
peal by a 6-2 vote. Both stood on an absolutely "black or
white," "all or nothing" approach to the problem. The debate
and vote, unfortunately, were conducted on that basis by two
camps which showed they had built-in prejudices either for
repeal or for retention, with not the slightest admission by
either side that any reasonable alternative might exist. A
resolution for repeal carried by a vote of 114 to 107, out of
a membership-of- 249, with a number of Delegates who were
present not voting.
It is highly significant that neither report even mentioned
the British, French or other reservations or withdrawal rights
discussed. Far worse, where the present status of the British,
French and Indian adherences to the Court were mentioned
in the Rhyne Report, it was implied that these nations had
simply repealed their so-called "self-judging" Connally type
reservations without enacting any other restrictions or reser-
vations. This Report stated:
India, England and France have repealed their Con-
nally type clause. They and thirty other nations now
accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The United
States is the only major free-world nation that is holding
back.
2 3
and concluded:
20. Id. at 241.
21. Id. at 236.
22. Id. at 233-255. (See the text of the various declarations.)
23. Rhyne, op. cit. supra note 11, at 763.
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We must join the 33 free world nations who have
accepted, without such reservation, the obligatory juris-
diction of the International Court and urge all other na-
tions to follow our lead.
24
Not a word anywhere in this thirty-three page Report about
the national security or other reservations by France, Eng-
land, India or Canada, or that twenty-three of the thirty-three
nations can get out at will !25
One might say that the foregoing statements simply lack
candor or are not the whole truth.
Such action [repeal] would only place our relations
with the Court on the same basis as those of France, the
United Kingdom, Canada and thirty other nations.
26
(Italics supplied.)
And, having in mind France's new reservation of "disputes
arising out of a crisis affecting the national security" 27 con-
sider the following statements by Messrs. Rhyne and Tondel,
made with no reference whatever thereto:
That France with her Algerian problems nonetheless
repealed her self-judging reservation is certainly a vote
of confidence in the Court.2
8
24. Id. at 779.
25. Professor Arthur Larson, of Duke University Law School, a member
of the ABA Committee on World Peace Through Law, wrote in the July
1960 ABA Journal, "France has repealed her self-judging clause. So has
India. So has Britain." He has also written, "The trend is now away
from this kind of clause. The leadership has been taken by France and
India which repealed their self-judging clauses in 1959. The United States
is now the only major power retaining this reservation." See Larson,
The Self-Judging Clause and Self-Interest, 46 A.B.A.J. 729, 747 (1960).
Mr. Lyman Tondel, of New York, also on the ABA Committee, wrote in
the same Journal, "France and India have recently given up their self-
judging reservations." See Tondel, The Connally Reservation Should Be
Repealed, 46 A.B.A.J. 726, 727 (1960).
Even Professor Jessup, our new judge on the Court, in a prepared
statement to the Foreign Relations Committee on February 12, 1960, said:
Great Britain has not felt or found it necessary to attach a self-
judging clause to its acceptance of the optional clause and it has had
more actual experience with the world court than the United States
has had. France, which had a self-judging clause copied from that
of the United States, withdrew it after its experience in the Norwegian
Loans case described above.
There was not a single sentence, line or word in any of these reports
or articles concerning the national security and other new reservations
which England, France or India adopted simultaneously with their repeal
of Connally type reservations, nor their ability, along with twenty-three
other nations of the thirty-nine, to get out at will! (Excepting only in a
"Dissenting Statement" of David F. Maxwell, Esq., of the Rhyne Commit-
tee, filed in August during the Convention.)
26. Rhyne, supra note 11.
27. '59-'60 Yearbook, p. 240.
28. Rhyne, op. cit., p. 751.
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Even France, in the face of its Algerian problem,
withdrew its self-judging reservation last summer. What
clearer testimonial could there be to the Court's reputa-
tion for not taking jurisdiction of domestic disputes.2 9
All of these statements, made with no mention whatever
of the national security and other protective reservations
adopted by Britain, France and India, when they dropped
their so-called "self-judging" provision, nor of the fact that
twenty-three nations of the thirty-nine adherents may get
out on notice, appeared in a barrage of publicity just before
the American Bar Association Convention last August. They
seem to have been accepted uncritically by Secretary Herter
and Attorney General Rogers, judging from their testimony
before the Senate Committee,3" and even by President Eisen-
hower, as indicated by his address on the subject to the Ameri-
can Bar Convention.
VII. THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON REPEAL OF
THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT.
For Repeal
a) The Connally Amendment is "self-judging" in
permitting a litigant to determine the Court's jurisdic-
tion in his own case.
b) This undermines and impairs the prestige of the
Court.
c) It is basically "immoral."
d) It may prevent use of the Court by the United
States when invoked reciprocally by our opponents.
e) We have ultimate protection anyway in our abil-
ity to prevent enforcement of any decision by exercise
of our veto power in the Security Council.
Against Repeal
a) We have a complete sovereign right to limit our
submission to the Court's jurisdiction, and would be
foolhardy not to do so; (that the characterization as
"self-judging" is simply a slogan or clich6 adopted by
repealists for its propaganda effect).
b) The Connally Amendment protects the national
security and "safeguards the vital interests of the
United States."
29. Tondel, op. cit., p. 727.
30. Hearings on S. 94, supra note 25.
8
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c) Other important nations have reservations con-
siderably more far-reaching.
d) The changing balance of power in the United
Nations.
1) ninety-nine nations membership now instead of
forty-six when the Court was established;
2) the new African bloc of twenty-six nations;
3) Red China's probable ultimate admission to
the U.N.; if -as a permanent member of the
Security Council, it will have a member of the-
Court.
e) Lack of any body of International Law.
f) Court judges are simply agents of their own
State.
1) Soviet Law - Vyshinsky's statement, on, per
Dean Stason.81
2) Two communist nations on Court; also United
Arab Republic.
3) Possible votes of Latin American nations
(Panama, Peru and Argentina) on questions.
involving our Cuban and Panama Canal bases.
VIII. THE ALTERNATIm SOLUTION.
The chief criticism of opponents of the Connally Amend-
ment is that it is "self-judging," that is, against the basic legal
principle that one should not be the judge of his own case,
and that, therefore, it is "immoral." 'The Amendment more
properly can be characterized as "self-preserving" in respect
of a sovereign nation for the reasons stated by Senator Con-
nally himself.
3 2
The Maryland Bar Association Committee definitely be-
lieved that outright repeal alone is not the proper answer.
It felt that this would amount to unilateral legal disarmament
in a world where we cannot afford unilateral military dis-
armament. The Committee arrived at and recommended a
solution which it considered a fair and sensible answer to the
problem without compromise of principle. The Maryland State
Bar Association, by an overwhelming majority on January
31. Vyshinsky, SovIEr CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 55 (1938) as quoted in
Stason, LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOVIET UNION,
43 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 152 (1960).
32. 92 CONG. REc. 10624 (1946).
524 [Vol. is
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21, 1961, adopted the Committee Report which made the fol-
lowing statement of findings the basis of its recommenda-
tions:
The present American declaration, embodying the Con-
nally Amendment, is not as vicious as some of its oppo-
nents would have us believe nor as sacrosanct as some
of its proponents would contend. It has been prompted
by the same motives which have prompted the reserva-
tions of other major powers - some of which, we submit,
are considerably more comprehensive in scope, more ef-
fective in their result, and less damaging to the prestige
of the World Court and the ideals it represents. In short,
we believe that the time has come to restate our declara-
tion in terms which, on the one hand, will protect our
independence, sovereignty and security, and yet, at the
same time, will promote to the maximum extent practical
under present world conditions the advancement of the
rule of law among nations. This is a balancing point of
reference which, we believe, has been all too often ig-
nored by both sides in the heat and hysteria of the Con-
nally debate. We further believe that the so-called 'self-
judging' aspects of our present declaration and the dan-
ger of their reciprocal invocation against us can be elimi-
nated by the-substitution of a new reservation which will
afford, in practical effect, a greater safeguard of our
national security, but which, at the same time, will be
less damaging to our position as an advocate of -world
peace through law and to the prestige and usefulness of
the Court.3 3
In line with this statement of principle the basic recom-
mendation was that:
Our present declaration should (a) neither be amended
by the deletion of the Connally Amendment; nor (b)
left in its present form; but (c) it should be rewritten
so as more fully to protect our independence, domestic
freedom and national sovereignty, while at the same
time restating our belief in the principles of world peace
through law to the maximum extent practical under pres-
ent world conditions. 4
33. The Special Committee on World Peace Through Law (of the Mary-
land Bar Ass'n), Report on the Connally Amendment, p. 31 (1960). (Sub-
mitted to the Maryland Bar Ass'n for consideration at the Mid-Winter
Meeting, January 21, 1961.)
34. Id. at 32.
10
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This exact language was used in a Resolution "adopted by a
substantial majority" by the Pennsylvania Bar Association on
January 28, 1961, after its committee had recommended out-
right repeal.
The specific recommendations of the Maryland Report are
that our entire present acceptance of jurisdiction be with-
drawn and a new acceptance substituted simultaneously
which will:
First-Unconditionally accept jurisdiction over all claims
for damages due to actions of a state causing injury to the
person or property of another state. This will obviate com-
pletely the criticism that Connally is against our self interest
by reasons of the right of other states to invoke its protection
reciprocally against us in such cases.
Second-In lieu of our entire present domestic matters
reservation, which contains the Connally Amendment, substi-
tute an exclusion of jurisdiction by the Court over specifically
enumerated items, such as, tariffs, immigration, atomic en-
ergy, offshore rights, currency changes, and such other mat-
ters as "have traditionally been considered within our domes-
tic jurisdiction."
Third-An exclusion of jurisdiction, modeled generally
after the British and French declarations, excepting from the
Court's jurisdiction disputes arising out of such matters as
war, international hostilities and military occupation, or our
rights in canals, waterways, military, naval and air bases,
and any other matter affecting the defense of the United
States or its national security.
The last two exclusions from jurisdiction specify clearly
in advance the extent to which we do not confer jurisdiction
on the Court. This is an absolute right of a sovereign state.
Such reservations would avoid any later requirement of "self-
judging" since they explicitly spell out the ground rules be-
fore the game begins. The word "traditional" has taken on
enormous significance recently in view of the fact that many
areas formerly considered purely domestic have been regarded
as international by the United Nations. A United States State
Department publication stated, "There is no longer any real
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs." Professor
Jessup, our new judge on the Court, in his book entitled Trans-
national Law espouses the doctrine that many matters closely
35. Id. at 31.
[Vol. 13
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related to national security are the subject of international
law.
3 6
How much better and more effective to have specific do-
mestic and national security reservations spelled out in ad-
vance, in order to safeguard the vital interests of the United
States, than to leave a declaration of reliance on Connally
to the decision of any particular State Department or Presi-
dent, particularly a State Department that already regards
it as "immoral"! Such specific provisions would be in line
with our historic concept of a government of laws and not
of men.
A specific national security reservation is, the Committee
felt, far more protective in some areas than the Connally
Amendment. In the Committee's view it might be extremely
difficult sensibly to maintain that the determination of our
rights vis . vis Panama or Colombia, as to the Canal Zone,
or as to Cuba, in regard to Guantanamo, may properly be re-
garded as purely domestic issues. We hold our rights in both
the Canal Zone and the Cuban naval base under long term
leases, with what is called "titular sovereignty" reserved in
the lessor nations.
The ability to get out immediately, if we wish, merely levels
us with England, France, India and Canada, the nations used
as prime examples by those favoring outright repeal only,
and with twenty other nations.
Lastly, in the judgment of the Committee, there is great
advantage in being forthright in the first instance. How much
more "immoral" to rely on and use our veto power in the
Security Council after a dispute has been argued, submitted
to the Court for determination and an award made against us,
than to prescribe in the first instance by clear and definite
exclusions from jurisdiction what we hold to be traditionally
domestic and necessary to safeguard the vital interests of
the United States!
36. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw (1956).
12
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